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INTRODUCTION

Dubbing its lawsuit "Roe v. Wade for Men," a men's rights advocacy
group filed a lawsuit in federal district court in March 2006 claiming that
current paternity laws violate their constitutional rights because paternity
and corresponding child support orders are premised on biological paternity
without considering parental intent or interaction with the child.1 Less a
case about reproductive rights, the case begs the question, on what basis
should fatherhood be established, biology or something more?
Biological paternity does not necessarily establish legal paternity.
Marriage has long served as the basis for establishing a child's paternity:
the husband of the child's mother has been presumed the child's father in
the absence of several extenuating circumstances. 2 Often, then, paternity is
predicated on both a biological and social relationship with the child.3
Sometimes, however, the husband is not the child's biological father but is
still deemed the child's legal father.4 In recent decades, in an attempt to
equalize the rights of marital and nonmarital children and ensure support
and benefits for children born out of wedlock, laws have been enacted to
establish paternity for a child out of wedlock based solely on biology.5 An
interesting disconnect thus emerges: biological fatherhood has been
subordinated to social fatherhood6 to preserve an intact familial relationship,
David Crary, Activists Seek to Let Fathers Opt Out of Child Support, BOSTON.COM,
1.
Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/03/09/
activistsseek to let fathers_opt out ofchildsupport/.
Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support
2.
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 331 (2005) ("[T]he
[marital] presumption was conclusive unless the husband was sterile, impotent, or had no access
to his wife during the relevant time period prior to birth."); see also Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth
Is Not a Defense in PaternityActions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 70, 73-81 (2000) (stating that
"impotence, sterility, or non-access to the wife" could rebut the presumption, and examining
three state models of the marital presumption).
Murphy, supra note 2, at 326 ("[T]he legal-i.e., married-father, the biological
3.
father, and the functional father were, in fact, often the same person.").
4.
Id. (describing that the rationales for the marital presumption were to protect children
from the stigma of illegitimacy and to preserve the sanctity of the traditional family). See infra
Part III.B for a discussion of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), in which the
Supreme Court applied the marital presumption to preserve the sanctity of the unitary family.
See infra Part III.A regarding the history of paternity and child support enforcement
5.
efforts.
6.
See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood,40 UCLA
L. REV. 637, 650, 671 (1993) (discussing the importance of a social relationship with the child's
mother through marriage or a marriage-like relationship, or a relationship with the child to
establish legal paternity). Throughout this article, I discuss social fathers, who have a legally
recognized parent-child relationship either because of the marital presumption or reliance on
emerging doctrines of functional and intentional parenthood. By "functional parent," I mean a
person who has assumed many of the daily responsibilities of parenting, such as providing food,
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yet biological fatherhood has served as the sole means to establish the legal
benefits and obligations of paternity. The commonality between the
biological and social paternity approaches is preservation of the unitary,
nuclear family: a family predicated on a two-parent paradigm consisting of
one mother and one father.7
Our society, however, includes many families which do not comport to
the traditional mold.8 In attempting to restrict parenthood to two
individuals-and, more specifically, paternity to one man-courts and
legislatures have created inconsistencies in the emphasis placed on
biological and social fatherhood. Rather than a paradigm which requires
choosing one type of fatherhood over the other, family law should instead
move to a model by which multiple fathers are recognized. While it may
often be the case that a biological father is also the social father-and one
man will enjoy all of the rights and responsibilities of parenthoodbiological and social fatherhood do not always coincide in the same
individual. In those instances, both types of fatherhood should be
recognized.
Improved reproductive technologies and changing societal and family
norms open the door to multiple parenthood. A simple "who's your daddy"
or "who's your mommy" may not be as readily obvious as it once was. Two
decades ago, for example, we did not question if a birth mother was, in fact,
a legal mother; only recently have women gestated eggs or embryos without
any connection to the genetic material. 9 In the paternity context, society
assumed a husband was the child's father pursuant to the marital
presumption, regardless of whether the husband was, in fact, the biological

shelter, clothing, and nurturance for the child. By "intentional parent," I refer to a person who
has manifested an intent to parent the child, either by actively participating in the mother's
pregnancy and encouraging the birth of the child, or by participating in reproductive technology
efforts to create the child.
7.
See infra Parts III, IV, and V in which I address the tension between biological and
social paternity in various contexts and the common denominator of the opinions, which is
preservation of the two-parent family.
8.
Statistics from the 2000 U.S. Census reveal that married-couple households with
children made up only twenty-four percent of all households, compared with forty percent in
1970. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 3 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20537.pdf.
9.
See, for example, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Ct. App.
1998), where a married couple contracted with a sperm donor, egg donor, and gestational
surrogate. The couple was deemed parents because of their "intent to parent," despite their lack
of any biological or genetic relationship to the baby. Id. at 293.
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father.'° For children born out of wedlock, society usually treated the child
as having one legal parent and forwent an analysis of paternity.1 '
A major shift in paternity jurisprudence commenced in the 1970s with
the enactment of several federal laws that mandated paternity establishment
and child support enforcement nationwide. 12 A primary basis upon which to
establish paternity for a child born out of wedlock is through the biological
relationship between father and child. Biology as the sole basis for
parentage establishment is closely linked with recent developments in
paternity law, child support enforcement, and welfare reform. 3 Regardless
of intent, an ongoing relationship with the child's mother, or acts of
parenting, biology alone can and does establish paternity.14
In recent decades, genetic testing-like reproductive technology-has
improved and we now have the scientific ability to identify each child's
biological mother and father. As courts and legislatures embrace functional
and intentional parenthood as alternatives to biological parenthood, the
disconnect between parenthood by biology and parenthood by social
relationship grows wider. While courts are beginning to imbue persons with
legal parental rights who have no biological connection to their children, the
push to establish paternity in greater numbers by relying on biology seems
grossly at odds with other family law trends.
A critical component of the discussion concerning the interplay of
biological and social paternity is the current adherence to the two-parent
paradigm. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of
non-marital, biological fathers who contested the termination of their
parental rights because they had not established a significant enough
connection with their child and the child's mother. 15 The biological father
was given no legal protection in those cases because another man had
assumed the role of father. Thus, biological fatherhood was subordinated to
social fatherhood because the Supreme Court continued to embrace the
10. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
11. Murphy, supra note 2, at 333 ("If a child's mother was married, her husband ... was
viewed as the father. If a child was born to an unmarried woman, the child had no father ....
[U]nmarried biological fathers were not recognized under the law.").
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. Laura Oren, The Paradoxof Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology 'Plus'
Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 47, 49 (2004).
14. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 505(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 332 (2000)
(providing that a man who is genetically related to a child should be legally declared the child's
father). See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text regarding a man who had no intent to
parent but after an unplanned pregnancy was adjudicated as the child's father and ordered to pay
child support.
15. See infra Part III.B.
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traditional two-parent family. Conversely, in the paternity context, courts
have used biology alone to establish parentage to ensure that a child has two
available parents-and two sources of financial support.16 In both contexts,
though, the full range of parental rights and responsibilities has been
conferred or denied in an effort to preserve a two-parent family.
Reliance on the traditional two-parent paradigm must yield to a more
flexible approach to parentage. Using paternity as a model, I propose that
courts disaggregate the rights and responsibilities of parentage. In the
absence of any other indicia of parentage, biology should not become the
predicate for a judgment of paternity that identifies the biological father as
the only legal father with the full range of responsibilities such judgment
entails. Rather, biological connection-standing alone-should have a more
limited function in determining the legal connection between the biological
father and child.
This article is the beginning of a larger exploration of multiple
parenthood. Strict adherence to a two-parent paradigm does not accurately
reflect many of today's families, such as multiple parents due to divorce and
remarriage, or multiple gay and lesbian parents. In writing this article, I
hope to present paternity as only one aspect of multiple parenthood. 7 I
propose that courts no longer be constrained by current legal doctrine to
choose either a biological father or social father, but instead recognize that
both men may have a sustainable legal relationship to the child and may
jointly share the responsibilities of fatherhood. 8 Biological fatherhood
should be but one determinate of full paternity; if a biological father has no
desire or intent to parent, has no functional connection with the child, and
has no social connection to the child's mother, he should not be the child's
only legal father. His role should be limited to modest financial support, if
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. I have chosen to focus this paper on paternity because of the current scholarly debate
concerning biological versus social paternity, as well as the recently heightened awareness of
"paternity fraud" and the trend for social fathers to "disestablish" their paternity. My discussion
is fairly narrow and limited to the initial establishment of paternity or disestablishment of
paternity in the more traditional cases. For example, I am not discussing the issue of sperm
donors, as there are additional policy issues implicit in that discussion. I anticipate that future
papers will discuss genetic donors as well as the many possible variations of multiple
parenthood.
18. Currently, Louisiana is the only jurisdiction to recognize dual paternity. See generally
State ex rel Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Howard, 03-2865 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/30/04); 898 So. 2d 443.
In permitting the state to establish the biological paternity of a child to obtain child support,
despite the presumption that the husband of the child's mother is the legal father, the court noted
that "[t]he concept of 'dual paternity' allows a child to seek support from the biological father
notwithstanding that the child was conceived or born during the mother's marriage to another
man, and is therefore presumed to be the legitimate child of the marriage." Id. at 444 (citing
Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813, 817 (La. 1974)).
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appropriate, and a source of genetic identity and history for the child. In this
way, social fathers may share in the responsibilities of fatherhood,
alongside the biological father, and may share in the many benefits.
Limiting the biological father's legal rights and responsibilities in this
manner fosters greater fairness in establishing parenthood: a man who truly
has neither desire nor intent to parent will have a more limited obligation to
the child under my proposal than the he does under the current regime.
More importantly, we can protect the institution of parenthood and
acknowledge that parentage is defined by much more than DNA.
In Part Two, I discuss the ways in which legal parenthood is established,
including responses to reproductive technology and the role of intent. Next,
in Part Three, I focus on the paternity paradox and preservation of the twoparent paradigm. Specifically, I explore the jurisprudential disconnect
between biological and social fatherhood in preserving and establishing
parental rights. I also review paternity fraud and the impact biological
versus social fatherhood has had on many legislatures and courts in Part
Four, again highlighting the struggle to preserve the two-parent paradigm.
Then, in Part Five, I examine the current scholarly debate regarding whether
biology should continue to serve as a basis for establishing parentage and
show the difficulty of "choosing" biological fatherhood over social
fatherhood.
Finally, in Part Six, I offer a new system for establishing parental rights.
Specifically, I conclude that parental rights should be disaggregated and
established pursuant to a continuum. While it is beneficial to a child to have
access to her genetic history and some financial support, biology alone
should not give rise to full parental obligations and rights without additional
intent or parental actions. To preserve the best interests of the child, we
should establish a system whereby a biological father is identified to
provide genetic history and, if appropriate, furnish a minimum amount of
child support. Yet, to preserve the integrity of parentage and in fairness to
biological fathers, a man who has expressed no parental intent nor parental
obligation should not shoulder the majority of responsibility for a child's
support.
Often the biological father will also be the social father, and all rights
and responsibilities will rest with him. In the absence of the combination of
biological and social fatherhood, a disaggregation of rights will permit a
social father to contribute financial support and nurturance, and to remove
the full burden of support from the biological father. 19 The biological father

19. Disaggregation of paternal rights would thus allow for two men to share the obligation
of support, if factually appropriate.
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will not have full parental rights without accepting them, thus enabling
another man to contribute to the child's welfare and support-and establish
a legal parental relationship. Finally, recognition of biological and social
fathers will help alleviate much of the current unrest concerning paternity
fraud, by protecting children's interests in their current relationships with
their social fathers and enabling them to commence a relationship with their
biological fathers.

II. DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE
The American family has undergone a metamorphoses and, with it,
family law jurisprudence has embraced numerous methodologies to begin
recognizing the legal rights of families that differ from the traditional,
nuclear family norm. In recent years, scholars, courts, and legislatures have
attempted to reconcile the application of current parentage laws to
nontraditional families and have further recognized new means of
establishing parentage.2 0 For example, the American Law Institute ("ALI")
recognizes parents by estoppel and de facto parents.' Several states have
enacted third party visitation statutes.22 Multiple court decisions recognize
the right of nonlegal lesbian mothers to maintain a relationship with the
children they helped to raise. 23 Although parent-child relationships
predicated on one biological mother and father are still the majority, other
parent-child relationships are gaining recognition.
Marriage has traditionally established legal parentage: a child born
within an extant marriage has two legal parents, the wife and husband.24
Moreover, the marital presumption has long operated to establish legal
20. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premiseof the Nuclear Family Has Failed,70 VA. L.
REV. 879 (1984); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger:
Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (2002)
[hereinafter Adjudicating Maternity]; Richard Storrow, Parenthoodby Pure Intention: Assisted
Reproduction and the FunctionalApproach to Parentage,53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002).
21. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2000).
22. See Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An
Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193, 211 (2004)
[hereinafter Paternity Fraud].
23. See Jacobs, Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 20, at 354-366 (reviewing several
cases in which courts preserved the relationship between the nonbiological mother and her
child). See also infra note 54 for additional cases in which the parental rights of the
nonbiological mother have been recognized.
24. For a thorough analysis of the marital presumption, see generally Theresa Glennon,
Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA.
L. REV. 547 (2000).
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paternity for a husband who may not be biologically related to his child. In
the absence of sterility, impotence, or non-access, a husband has been
presumed the father of a child born into marriage.2 5
For children born out of wedlock, only one legal parent was recognized,
the mother; the biological father bore no responsibilities nor rights to the
child. 6 Today, all jurisdictions have statutes that permit a child, or her
mother or father to seek a paternity judgment. 7 Once a judgment of
paternity is entered, the father is a legal parent with all of the
responsibilities and rights of parentage. 8 In 1973, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform
Parentage Act ("UPA") to protect the rights of nonmarital children. 29 The
UPA recognizes biological connection with the child as well as various
social connections, such as marriage to the child's mother or functional
parenthood, as bases for establishing paternity.
The UPA contains several "presumptions" of fatherhood, most
predicated on marriage, by presuming that a man who is married to the
child's mother at the time of her birth, married the mother after the child's
birth and voluntarily asserted his paternity in a recorded document, or
terminated a marriage within 300 days after the child's birth is the child's
legal father. 3' The presumption may only be rebutted by an adjudication
within two years of the child's birth.31 The presumption most relevant to
this discussion is the fifth presumption, namely that "for the first two years
of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the child and
openly held out the child as his own."3 2 This presumption recognizes both
intent and function: that a man who is not biologically related to a child
may still intend to parent the child and engages in active parenting by living
with the child and holding the child out as his own. It demonstrates, too,

25. Murphy, supra note 2, at 331-32 (explaining that non-access could only be proven if
the husband was away for longer than nine months).
26. Id. at 332-33; see also Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and
Future of PaternityLaw and ParentalStatus, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6 (2004).
27. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 602 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 338 (2001) (providing

that the child, mother of the child, man whose paternity is to be adjudicated, or supportenforcement agency all have standing to initiate paternity proceedings).
28. For a review of the many tangible and intangible benefits and responsibilities of
parentage, see Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 20, at 346-47.

29. The Uniform Parentage Act was revised in 2000 and 2002. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 296 (Supp. 2006).
30. Id. § 204(a).
31. Id. §§ 204(b), 607(a). Section 607 includes a two-year statute of limitations during
which paternity presumptions may be rebutted by judicial proceeding. Id. § 607(a).
32. Id. § 204(a)(5).
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that the act of fathering may give rise to legal parentage and that those
actions are often more significant than biological connection alone.
Historically, there was no need to evaluate and examine parental intent
and function; the marital and/or biological connection presumed or
subsumed those parentage elements.3 3 However, with the advent of new
reproductive technologies, such as artificial insemination and surrogacy, the
relationship between biology and intent requires re-examination. When one
or neither parent has a genetic connection to the child, courts have
determined that "intent" to parent can substitute biological connection and
parentage can be established without adoption or other procedure.34 For
example, the UPA provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction. 35 In artificial insemination,
intent is superior to biology in paternal decision-making.36
Modern gestational surrogacy arrangements frequently rely upon
parental intent as a substitute for biological relationship in determining legal
parentage. For example, in Johnson v. Calvert,37 the California Supreme
Court was required to determine maternity under California's Uniform

33. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 326 (explaining that the marital presumption vested
paternity in one man who was generally both the biological and social father).
34. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Ct. App. 1998).

35.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 702 (2000). The comment further explains:

If a child is conceived as the result of assisted reproduction, this section
clarifies that a donor (whether of sperm or egg) is not the parent of the
resulting child. The donor can neither sue to establish parental rights, nor be
sued and required to support the resulting child. In sum, donors are
eliminated from the parental equation
This section of UPA (2000) further opts not to limit nonparenthood of a
donor to situations in which the donor provides sperm for assisted
reproduction by a married woman. This requirement is not realistic in light of
present practices in the field of assisted reproduction. Instead, donors are to
be shielded from parenthood in all situations in which either a married
woman or a single woman conceives a child through assisted reproduction.
Id. § 702 cmt.
The issue of whether sperm and egg donors should have anonymity is a source of current
debate. While some fertility experts are in favor of anonymity to protect customers from being
caught up in potential custody battles, other customers would like access to donor information,
both for genetic medical history purposes as well as to give children the opportunity to contact
their genetic parent and learn more about their genetic identity. See Amy Harmon, Are You My
Sperm Donor? Few Clinics Will Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at Al. See also infra Part
V.A.2 regarding the issue of genetic identity.
36. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 356 (Supp. 2006)
(providing, in part, "[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a
woman ... is a parent of the resulting child.").
37. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
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Parentage Act.38 Mark and Crispina Calvert had contracted with Anna
Johnson to serve as a gestational surrogate for them.39 Although Crispina
had had a hysterectomy and could not gestate a pregnancy, she was able to
produce eggs, and Anna became the gestational surrogate for an embryo
created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's egg.4 ° During the pregnancy,
Anna became reluctant to give the child to the Calverts and ultimately
sought to establish her maternity and keep the baby.4 1 The court had to
choose who was the legal mother: the birth mother or the genetic mother?
The case illustrates both the way in which courts use substitutes for
biological connection in establishing parental rights and are constrained to
legalize parental rights for only two parents. In fact, the Johnson court
specifically wrote that California law recognizes only one mother.4 2 Thus, it
was obligated to craft a doctrine by which a "tie-breaker" of sorts could be
implemented to choose one mother over another and preserve the traditional
family unit. To make its decision, the court looked to the parties' intent
prior to the pregnancy.4 3 While Crispina had a genetic connection with the
child, Anna was the birth mother; both women qualified as a parent under
the UPA. 4 The court concluded that, "she who intended to procreate the
child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California law. 45
While the case does include biological connection, it helped pave the way
for future rulings in which intent trumped any biological connection with
the child. Moreover, the case reinforced the traditional two-parent
paradigm.
In a more unusual case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, five people were
responsible for the birth of a child, and the court needed to determine two
legal parents.46 Luanne and John Buzzanca "agreed to have an embryo

38. Id. at 777-78.
39. Id. at 778.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 781.
43. Id. at 782.
44. Id. Under California's Uniform Parentage Act, the mother and child relationship may
be established either by the woman giving birth to the child or under the Act. Id. at 780 (citing
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003 (repealed 1994)) (emphasis added). Like the UPA, California's version
makes the provisions relating to paternity applicable to maternity declarations, too, whenever
practicable. Id. One means by which to establish paternity is through evidence from genetic
testing. Id. at 781. Because genetic testing excluded Anna as the child's genetic mother and
confirmed that Crispina was, in fact, the genetic mother, both women qualified as "mother"
under the Act. Id.
45. Id. at 782.
46. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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genetically unrelated to either of them implanted in ... a surrogate. 47 After

the pregnancy, John filed for divorce, and a trial court was asked to
determine the legal parents of the child, Jaycee. 48 The trial court decided
that Jaycee had no legal parents. 49 Because the surrogate and her husband
had agreed in writing that they were not the lawful parents5° and because
neither Luanne nor John had a biological connection to Jaycee, the trial
court determined no legal parents existed.51
The appellate court disagreed and, in beginning its analysis, clarified that
legal motherhood could be established other than by giving birth or
contributing an egg. 2 Analogizing to paternity law, the court recognized
that fatherhood can be established by conduct, such as permitting a spouse
to be artificially inseminated. 3 Because Luanne "caused Jaycee's
conception and birth by initiating the surrogacy arrangement," she intended
the birth, intended to parent, and thus should have been declared the legal
mother.54 Given the circumstances of the case, the court made a good
decision for Jaycee. In reaching its conclusion, however, the court was
forced to perform some legal gymnastics to ensure it applied various
presumptions to achieve a two-parent family and no more.
More recently, courts have applied the intent test to legalize the
parentage of non-biological lesbian co-parents.55 In addition, the ALl
Principles permit a determination of legal parentage in the absence of
biology.56 Parent by estoppel incorporates both function and intent: one who
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The Buzzanca court permitted the contractual relinquishment of any parental rights by
the surrogate and her husband. Id. The UPA similarly permits a surrogate and her husband to
waive their parental rights. UNIE. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 362
(2000). The UPA specifically authorizes gestational agreements and provides further that the
prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is married, and the donors relinquish all
parental rights and that the intended parents will be the legal parents of the child. Id.
51. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 291.
55. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662-63 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a
lesbian partner who agreed to have children with her partner, supported her partner's artificial
insemination with an anonymous donor, and actively parented the children with her partner
while living together as a family unit is a parent under the Uniform Parentage Act); Kristine H.
v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692, 696 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a woman was estopped from
attacking the validity of a parentage stipulation jointly signed and filed by her and her lesbian
partner, and that permitting an attack on the validity of the judgment would contravene public
policy that favors a child having two legal parents).
56. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2000).
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intended to parent a child and engages in specific acts of parenting is
entitled to full parental rights under the ALI Principles.57 Even the
application of modem parentage approaches, however, has been used to
maintain the traditional two-parent family paradigm. 8 By recognizing two
lesbian mothers, two gay fathers, or a mother and father who used a donor
egg and/or sperm, the courts move beyond biological parentage while still
reinforcing the two-parent paradigm.
While many courts have used equitable approaches to establish legal
parenthood for a second, non-biological parent, other courts have placed
heightened emphasis on biological fatherhood to establish or disestablish
paternity. The next section addresses the paradox of using biological
fatherhood to establish paternity yet rejecting biological fatherhood when a
social father is available.
III.

THE PATERNITY PARADOX AND PRESERVATION OF THE TwO-PARENT
PARADIGM

Given the greater reliance on functional and intentional parenthood, it is
anachronistic to establish paternity with all of the responsibilities and
benefits thereof based solely on biological fatherhood. Many scholars note
that parentage law has presumed that something more than biology creates
the legal rights and responsibilities of parenthood. 9 For instance, it is a well
57.

A parent by estoppel is defined, in part, as:
[A]n individual who, though not a legal parent, .. . lived with the child since
the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent
responsibilities as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the
child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a
child together each with full parental rights and responsibilities, when the
court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child's best
interests; or ... lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an
agreement with the child's parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both
parents), when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is
in the child's best interests.

Id.
58. See Storrow, supra note 20, at 639-40. Professor Storrow observes that parenthood by
intention has been largely used to resolve parentage determinations for married couples who
have used assisted reproduction. Id. He argues, however, that the doctrine of intentional
parenthood should be applied more broadly. Id.
59. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 323 (2004) (stating that "biology has never been all-determinative in
defining parentage, whether in nature or under law .... For as long as law has governed various
family matters among humans, it has looked at biology as only one among a number of factors
to be used in deciding how to allocate parental rights and responsibilities.").
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established principle that unwed fathers must meet the "biology plus"
standard to contest a termination of their parental rights.60 Paradoxically,
however, family law jurisprudence seems to be moving in two directions at
once. Although courts and legislatures are embracing alternatives to
biological parenthood, biology alone frequently establishes parentage,
especially when the state has an interest in establishing paternity and6 1a
concurrent child support order, i.e., when in the interest of the public fisc.
The disconnect between establishing legal parentage for a nonbiological
father who intends to and actively nurtures the child and conferring full
parental rights and responsibilities on a biological father who has no intent
to be a parent is illustrated in the following example. Imagine that a couple
engages in oral sex; without telling the man, the woman uses the sperm
from the sexual act to become pregnant. She later brings a paternity action
and sues for child support. Is the sperm donor a father? What sounds like
the stuff of a movie or novel has allegedly occurred and was widely
publicized in national newspapers, websites, and blogs.62 In one case, a
man's paternity was adjudicated, and he was ordered to pay child support
despite his contention that he never engaged in sexual intercourse with the
mother, but rather, she "stole" his sperm after performing fellatio and
impregnated herself without his knowledge or consent.63 Under our current
paternity laws, his biological fatherhood is sufficient to establish his legal
parenthood, despite his lack of intent to become a parent.
The allegations regarding the "sperm theft" may or may not be true;
regardless, this case should give us pause and encourage us to consider
60. See generally Dolgin, supra note 6; David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the
ConstitutionalDilemma of the Faultless Father,41 ARIz. L. REV. 753 (1999). See infra Part
II.B for a discussion of the "biology-plus" cases.
61. See Oren, supra note 13, at 77. Analyzing several Supreme Court cases regarding
invalidating insufficient statutes of limitations for filing paternity suits, Professor Oren notes:
An interesting thread runs through the cases .... In each situation, the
state limited the ability to file suit against unmarried fathers, which
paradoxically cuts against its own interest in maximum collection. The
Justices focused on the rights of nonmarital children, but they clearly
considered the impact of their decisions on the public fisc.
Id.
62. See, e.g., Sperm: The Gift that Keeps on Giving, MSNBC.coM, Feb. 24, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7024930/ (discussing an appeals court opinion in which the court
refused to recognize a cause of action of theft regarding the sperm allegedly stolen after fellatio,
but permitting a claim for emotional distress).
63. See Irons v. Phillips, No. 00 D6 79109 (Cook County Cir. Ct., Jul. 18, 2005). Judge
Thomas J. O'Hara reiterated the court's findings that: (1)the DNA evidence indicated that
Phillips was the father of the child; (2) that a paternity order and child support order were
previously entered by the court; and (3) that an order for child support arrearage should be
entered as well as an order of no visitation between Phillips and the child. Id.
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whether biology alone suffices to establish parentage. Although we want
children to have financial and emotional support, by predicating all of these
rights and responsibilities on biology, the law creates a legal relationship for
the child that may offer no nurturance, just potential financial support (and
likely potential conflict and animosity), while also preventing another man
from establishing any legal parental rights. By using biology alone to
establish paternity, children may be deprived of a man who would like to
assume the responsibilities of parenthood but may be reluctant to do so
because he will have no parental rights. On the other hand, to reject biology
as a basis of parenthood seems to completely ignores the importance of
genetic identity and heritage as well as an important source of support for a
child.
A. The Role of FederalChild Support Enforcement
As a result of national child support enforcement efforts, biology has
played an increasingly important role in establishing paternity, largely to
help the public fisc. Conversely, more courts and legislatures are moving
away from strict reliance on biology or marriage to establish parenthood
due to function and intent. In the paternity context, biology has never been
the sole determinate of parental rights under Supreme Court jurisprudence
and yet for purposes of the public fisc, biology reigns supreme.
For many years, a child born out of wedlock only had one legal parent,
the mother.64 In fact, unwed fathers often had no rights or responsibilities to
their biological children.65 Professor Katharine Baker traces the origins of
legal paternity and support laws and her discussion reveals the importance
of the public fisc in initial paternity development. The duty of a biological
father to support his non-marital child originated in England in 1576 as part
of the British Poor Laws but only obligated men whose children were
receiving a form of public assistance. 66 Other non-marital children were not
entitled to support until 1844.67 In the United States, paternity was fairly
haphazard, with some states establishing the duty to support in the criminal
context and other states refusing to impose any support obligation on an
unmarried father.68
64. See Baker, supra note 26, at 6.
65. See id. (discussing the refusal of several states to impose any duties of support on
biological fathers and noting that a court even refused to permit a child to have his paternity
investigated),
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (noting that some states did not recognize a duty to support and that "[a]s late as
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Meanwhile, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court rendered a
number of opinions in which it determined that non-marital children were
entitled to many of the benefits of marital children. The Court made several
rulings to protect the rights of children born out of wedlock, such as the
right to receive child support, 69 sustain an action for wrongful death, 70 and
recover under a state's workers' compensation law. 71 The Court's focus in
these cases was the best interests of the child or children, and their
entitlement to benefits.7 2
In response to the Supreme Court rulings, and in an effort to equalize the
rights of non-marital and marital children, the Uniform Parentage Act was
promulgated in 1973. 73 Its purpose was to establish a civil scheme whereby
legal parentage would be established for non-marital children, allowing for
corresponding child support obligations and custody benefits-and to
ensure that a child has two legal parents to provide financial and emotional
support. 74 Nineteen states have adopted the UPA and several others have
adopted many of its provisions.75 Soon thereafter, Congress entered the
paternity arena. As Professor Laura Oren has observed, "[e]ver since 1975,
with increasing vehemence, federal policy has encouraged and, indeed,
76
coerced the identification of the biological fathers of nonmarital children.,
1971, Texas and Idaho refused to impose any support obligation on an unmarried father.").
69. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (holding that children born out of
wedlock are constitutionally entitled to the same right of support as are children of married
parents).
70. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause not to permit five children born out of wedlock to seek damages as a result of
the wrongful death of their mother).
71. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169-70 (1972). Two children born out
of wedlock sought to recover under a state's workers' compensation law but were denied
because of their illegitimate status. Id. at 167. The children lived in an intact household with
their unwed mother and father, and their father's four legitimate children from his marriage. Id.
at 165. Based on the fact that they comprised an intact family, the Court found it violated the
Equal Protection Clause to deny the two children born out of wedlock the same right to sue
under a workers' compensation law as the four legitimate children. Id. at 169-70, 176.
72. Dolgin, supra note 6, at 663 n.114. Professor Dolgin observes that although the
biological paternity cases
make declarations of paternity on the basis of legal biological paternity
alone, they are essentially decisions that the biological father bears a certain
contractual, financial obligation . . . . No relationship with the child is
assumed to flow from the man's biological paternity. His responsibility for
the child's support is in essence, . . . a matter between the man ... and the
state.
Id.
73. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 296 (Supp. 2006).
74. Id.
75. Id. (stating that nineteen states adopted the UPA as of December 2002).
76. Oren, supra note 13, at 94.
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In 1975, Congress established the federal office of child support
enforcement.77 Pursuant to the legislation establishing the office of child
support enforcement and programs, each state was required to develop its
own child support enforcement program. Under the initial legislation, a
cooperative endeavor between the state and federal government was
envisioned and states received some federal funding for their state
programs.7 8 Moreover, despite the fact that states have discretion to develop
their programs, federal requirements are imposed.79 One of the most
significant pieces of legislation regarding the federal child support
enforcement program is the Family Support Act of 1988 ("FSA").8 ° The
FSA set "performance standards for state programs establishing paternity,"
81
and "[s]tates must meet a specified 'paternity establishment percentage.,,
The FSA also requires presumptive use of mandatory child support
guidelines for establishing child support awards, periodic review of child
support orders, and development of statewide automated systems.8" As
Professor Oren explains, the welfare reform initiatives of 1996 placed even
greater emphasis on paternity establishment and was designed to promote
male responsibility.83
Paternity establishment and a child's corresponding entitlement to
support and benefits are often based purely on biological connection.
Regardless of the father's intent or desire to parent, he will be adjudicated
the child's legal father and will have all the responsibilities of fatherhood.
As Professor Baker observes, "much paternity law seems to be based on a
strict liability theory for genetic contribution." 84 Thus, the "sperm-theft"
father was deemed the child's legal father and a child support obligation
imposed, regardless of his lack of intent to parent and alleged lack of sexual
intercourse. 85
77. Child Support Enforcement Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 651 (2000).
78. For a thorough discussion of the development of paternity and child support
enforcement legislation, see Murphy, supra note 2.
79. A 1984 amendment to the Child Support Enforcement Act requires states to use wage
garnishment. See Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 466(a)(8), 98 Stat. 1305 (1984).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 652 (2000).
81.
D. KELLY WEISBERG & SuSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 507 (2d ed. 2002).
82. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 576 n.15 (3d ed.

1998).
83. Oren, supra note 13, at 97-98. Oren writes that the purpose of the new legislation was
to alleviate child poverty by establishing paternity and corresponding child support orders. Id. at
98. To establish paternity in greater numbers, states were required to have in-hospital voluntary
paternity establishment procedures and other administrative procedures for ordering genetic
testing. Id. at 98-99.
84. See Baker, supra note 26, at 8-9.
85. See infra Part V.A. regarding "assumption of the risk" and child support obligations.
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Paternity laws have not gone unchallenged.86 In a recent Hawaii court
decision, a man challenged the constitutionality of the UPA.8 7 John and Jane
Doe met in high school and dated for about fourteen months.88 The couple
agreed to use condoms to avoid pregnancy, and the facts revealed that the
couple did not intend to procreate; Jane Doe became pregnant, however,
and she decided against abortion or placing the child up for adoption.89 John
Doe strongly opposed her decision. 90 After the child's birth, Jane Doe began
receiving state assistance, and the state filed a paternity action on behalf of
the child. 9' Genetic testing proved that John Doe was the child's father and
he was ordered to pay child support. 92 John Doe appealed and challenged
the constitutionality of Hawaii's version of the UPA ("HUPA") as a
violation of his equal protection and procreational autonomy rights, and
further challenged the trial court's child support order. 93
The Hawaii Supreme Court disagreed and found that HUPA did not
violate Doe's rights. 94 First, the court determined that the level of review
applicable was rational basis, as "HUPA does not implicate the father's
fundamental privacy right to procreational autonomy, but rather his
economic interest in not supporting his child" and that the biological
relationship of fathers to children is a non-suspect classification.95 The court
determined that HUPA does not create an improper gender-classification,
but rather distinguishes parties based on their biological relationship to the
child, which is subject only to rational basis review. 96
The alleged sperm-theft father demonstrates the tenuousness of imposing all parental
responsibilities by virtue of biological connection alone, especially if the man does not think he
is engaging in activity which in the ordinary course could possibly result in pregnancy. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. In a highly publicized case filing, a men's rights group has recently filed in federal
district court a lawsuit nicknamed "Roe v. Wade for Men." See supra note 1 and accompanying
text. The group claims that men's reproductive choice is violated by paternity establishment and
child support enforcement, as women have the choice to abort or place a child for adoption and
men do not have a similar choice. Id.
87. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461,463 (Haw. 2005).
88. Id. at 463-64.
89. Id. at 464.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. Following the filing of the complaint by the Child Support Enforcement Agency,
the parties stipulated to genetic testing, which revealed a 99.99 percent probability of paternity.
Id. The father did not contest his biological paternity but objected to having his legal paternity
established and to being ordered to pay child support. Id.
93. Id. at 463.
94. Id. at 468.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 471.
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The court further explained that the State had not interfered with Doe's
right of procreation: the State did not require him to engage in sexual
activity nor did it interfere with his right to use contraception. 97 Just because
a woman has more control over the decision whether to bear the child, both
parents are aware of the possibility of pregnancy when they engage in "a
course of conduct inconsistent with the exercise of [their] right not to beget
a child." 98 The court thus concluded that Doe's economic interest was
implicated rather than his right to procreational autonomy. 99 Using rational
basis review, the court held that HUPA furthers a legitimate state interest by
protecting the financial welfare of children and the public welfare."°°
Even if a mother agrees to waive or limit child support, courts have held
that the waiver or limitation is violative of public policy.'O° A recent
California court held that if the father voluntarily terminates his parental
rights with the mother's approval as a matter of convenience to guarantee
no contact between the father and child and to obviate the father's support
obligation, public policy will intervene to "protect the child's continued
right to support."' 1 2 Although the mother and father in this case stipulated to
the father's termination of parental rights and the mother argued that she
should be free to raise her child as a single parent, the court wrote "'by
recognizing the value of determining paternity ... the Legislature implicitly

recognized the value of having two parents, rather than one, as a source of
both emotional and financial support.'""0 3

Interestingly, as the next section demonstrates, while biology often
results in paternity establishment and child support obligations, biological
paternity is insufficient to protect paternal rights when not related to the
public fisc.

97. Id. at 469.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 472. The court noted that "the imposition of support obligations on fathers rather
than non-fathers is not arbitrary or capricious." Id. The court also rejected Doe's claim that
imposition of child support violated his right to be free from compulsory service-"[t]he
father's arguments are so palpably lacking in merit as to suggest bad faith on the part of the
pleader." Id. Finally, the court held that Doe's appeal was frivolous because each contention
was "long ago put to rest by well-settled precedent." Id. at 474. Doe was ordered to pay
damages and costs. Id. at 475.
101. Kristine M. v. David P., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 749 (Ct. App. 2006).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 788 (quoting Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669 (Cal. 2005))
(emphasis added).
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B. The Supreme Court and "Biology-Plus"

As the Court decided several cases regarding the rights of nonmarital
children and Congress developed its federal initiatives to establish paternity
and support, the Court also decided several cases concerning the rights of
unwed fathers. In each case, an unwed father challenged a state's ability to
terminate his parental rights. While the Court has long deemed parental
rights fundamental and one of the most important rights necessitating
protection," in the following cases a biological father did not have
constitutional protection without better indicia of parentage than biology.
Ultimately, the Court determined that an unwed father's paternal rights
were deserving of protection only if he demonstrated a commitment to a
parental relationship with his child, not just a mere biological connection.
In Stanley v. Illinois,"°5 an unwed father challenged the State's authority
to put his children in foster care pursuant to a presumption that unwed
fathers are unfit to care for, and have no legal standing to raise, their
children.' °6 The Court emphasized not only that Stanley had sired his
children but raised them, too. 0 7 In fact, the Court did not merely see Stanley
as the biological father of children with whom he had little or no
relationship; rather, the Court noted that refusing Stanley a hearing
concerning his parental fitness violated the Due Process Clause because of
10 °8
the very important issue at stake-"the dismemberment of his family.
The Court thus struck down the Illinois presumption as a violation of
Stanley's due process and equal protection rights.'0 9
Then, in a series of three cases, the Court established what has become
known as the "biology-plus" test. In these cases, unwed fathers challenged
104. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
includes the right to "establish a home and bring up children" without state interference).
105. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
106. Id. at 646. To demonstrate that children were wards of the state, Illinois had to prove
that either the child had no surviving parent or that the parent did not provide suitable care. Id.
at 649. The Illinois statute defined parent as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the
survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child," but the statute did not include
unwed fathers. Id. at 650 (citing ILL. REV. STAT., c. 37 § 701-14).
107. Id. at 651 ("The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and.., protection.").
108. Id. at 658. As Professor Janet Dolgin observes, "[t]he Court's decision in Stanley
strongly suggests that the rights extended to Stanley depended on his position as a biological
and a social father to his children." Dolgin, supra note 6, at 650.
109. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
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the termination of their parental rights when their child was to be adopted
by a stepfather. The Court concluded that an unwed father did not have the
right, pursuant to biology alone, to challenge the termination of his rights;
only if he had actively engaged in parenting could he challenge the
termination.
In Quilloin v. Walcott,'10 an unwed father, Quilloin, sought to prevent the
adoption of his son by the stepfather."' The child was born in 1964 and was
in the sole custody and control of his mother, Walcott, for twelve years
prior to the adoption proceedings.' 12 Walcott married in 1967, and in 1976
she consented to the son's adoption by her husband. 1 3 Quilloin objected to
the adoption petition and sought visitation but did not seek a custody
order. 114 The Georgia adoption scheme provided that a child born in
wedlock could not be adopted without the consent of both parents, but a
child born out of wedlock could be adopted solely with the mother's
consent."' Quilloin argued that the differential treatment violated his due
process and equal protection rights.116
Unlike Stanley, the Court did not agree that the Georgia statute violated
the due process and equal protection rights of an unwed father." 7 In fact,
distinguishing this case from one in which the State was attempting to force
the breakup of a family, the Court noted that Quilloin had never sought
physical or legal custody of his son." 8 Moreover, the Court noted that the
adoption would instead grant "full [legal] recognition to a family unit
already in existence" rather than deprive Quilloin of any constitutional
rights.' 9
One year later, the Court was again confronted with a case concerning
the rights of an unwed father who did not consent to his children's adoption
110. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
Ill. Id. at 247.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 248 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975)).
116. Id. at 252-53.
117. Id. at 256.
118. Id. at 255 (noting that due process is likely violated if the state attempts to force the
breakup of a natural family over the objections of the parents (citing Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J. concurring))).
119. Id. at 255 (emphasis added). In concluding that the adoption statute did not deprive
Quilloin of any due process or equal protection right, the Court specifically noted that by not
having any custodial relationship with his son, he shouldered no significant responsibility
regarding "supervision, education, protection, or care of [his son]." Id. at 256. While Quilloin's
parental rights were not protected by the decision, the Court emphasized the importance of a
nurturing family by protecting the child's right to be adopted by the man who had shouldered
parental responsibility. Id. at 255-56.
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by their mother's new husband. 120 Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed
lived together from September 1968 until the end of 1973.12' Although
never legally married, the two held themselves out as husband and wife and
during this time they had two children: David born in 1969 and Denise born
in 1971 122 Caban was listed as the father on each child's birth certificate; he
lived with them for the first few years of their lives, and he contributed to
their support. 12 After the couple ended their relationship, Caban continued
to visit the children, although they ultimately moved to Puerto Rico with
their maternal grandmother.124 Caban subsequently communicated with the
children through his parents, who also resided in Puerto Rico. 125 In
November 1975, Caban traveled to Puerto Rico to visit with the children for
a few days and, rather than return them to their grandmother, brought them

to New York. 126
A custody battle ensued, with Mohammed and her husband seeking to
adopt the children and Caban cross-petitioning for adoption. 127 The
Mohammeds' petition was granted, with the judge noting the limited right
of an unwed father under New York's adoption statute, 12 specifically
section 111.129 Essentially, the New York adoption statute permitted an
unwed mother to preclude the adoption of her child simply by withholding
her consent, whereas an unwed father had no similar right, even if he had a
substantial relationship with the child. 30 Rather, an unwed father could only
prevent adoption if he could prove it was not in the child's best interests.'3
Subsequent to the upholding of the adoption ruling by the NY Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Caban appealed, alleging that the statute violated
both his equal protection and due process rights.' 32
120. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
121. Id. at 382.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 383.
126. Id.
127. Id. As the Supreme Court noted, while an unwed mother has many parental rights
without adopting her child, the adoption statute was interpreted to permit adoption of a child
born out of wedlock by her mother. Id. at 383 n.1 (citing In re Anonymous Adoption, 31
N.Y.S.2d 595 (Surr. Ct. 1941)) (addressing the use of New York Domestic Relations Law
section 110).
128. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977) (providing, in part, that consent to
adoption shall be required of the mother of a child born out of wedlock). There is no
corresponding provision requiring consent of an unwed father. See id.
129. Caban, 441 U.S. at 384.
130. Id. at 386-87.
131. Id. at 387.
132. Id. at 385.
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The Supreme Court agreed that section 111 violated the Equal Protection
Clause because of impermissible gender-based distinctions. 133 Mohammed
argued that the state had a substantial interest in promoting the adoption of
illegitimate children, and that requiring consent of unwed fathers would
both discourage adoption and make the process more difficult, as locating
unwed fathers during adoption proceedings could significantly impede the
adoption process.134 Neither argument was persuasive,135 and the Court held
that by excluding loving fathers from participation in the decision of
whether their children could be adopted or permitting a mother to arbitrarily
deny paternal rights to an unwed father, section 111 violated equal
protection.136 Integral to the Court's opinion was the relationship that Caban
had established with his children: the Court stated that "[t]he facts of this
case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being invariably
less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as
to the fate of their children.' 37
Four years later, the Court heard another case in which it considered
whether, "New York has sufficiently protected an unmarried father's
inchoate relationship with a child whom he has never supported and rarely
seen in the two years since her birth."'' 38 The father, Lehr, argued, pursuant
to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, that he had "an absolute
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the child may be
adopted."' 3 9 The Court disagreed, for many of the reasons articulated in
Quilloin.4 ° Lehr's daughter, Jessica, was born in November 1976 and her
mother, Robertson, married eight months after Jessica's birth.14 ' When
Jessica was a little more than two years old, her mother and stepfather
sought to adopt her and the petition was granted.14 1 One month after the
133. Id. at 389. The Court specifically noted that in its Quilloin decision it had reserved the
question whether gender-based distinctions within a statute such as section 111 would violate
equal protection because the claim was not properly presented. Id. at 389 n.7.
134. Id. at 390-92.
135. The Court noted that "in cases such as this, where the father has established a
substantial relationship with the child and has admitted his paternity, a State should have no
difficulty in identifying the father even of children born out of wedlock." Id. at 393. The Court
further observed that "[t]he effect of New York's classification is to discriminate against unwed
fathers even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal
interest in the child." Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249-50 (1983).
139. Id. at 250.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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commencement of the adoption proceedings, Lehr filed a visitation
and
143
dismissed.
ultimately
was
which
county,
another
in
paternity petition
On appeal, Lehr argued that "a putative father's actual or potential
relationship with a child born out of wedlock" is a protected liberty
interest.'" The Court found that "[t]he difference between the developed
parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the
potential relationship involved in Quilloin and this case, is both clear and
significant."' 45 The Court observed that a father who demonstrates a "full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood" acquires protection under
the Due Process Clause. 46 The Court further observed that the "mere
existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection."' 4 7 In an oft quoted passage, Justice Stevens continued to discuss
the relevance of biology to parental rights:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring, If he grasps that
opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the
child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution
will not automatically compel a State
to listen to his opinion of
148
where the child's best interests lie.

143. Id. at 252-53. Prior to granting the adoption, the family court examined the putative
father registry and found no record of Lehr, thereby allowing the petition. Id. at 251. New York
law provided that a man who files with the registry is entitled to notice of adoption proceedings;
similarly, if a man put his name on the child's birth certificate, lived with the child and her
mother and held himself out as the father, or was named by the mother as the child's father in a
sworn statement would also be entitled to notice. Id.
Although Lehr had not lived with Jessica, nor appeared on her birth certificate, nor filed
with the registry, he claimed special circumstances, specifically, that he had filed a paternity
action. Id. at 252. While the judge hearing the adoption case was made aware of the paternity
proceeding, he went ahead and granted the adoption without officially notifying Lehr,
maintaining that New York law did not require notice in these circumstances. Id. at 253. Both
the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals upheld the ruling that the filing of the
paternity action did not require Lehr to receive notice. Id. at 253-55. The Appellate Division
emphasized that Lehr could have protected his rights if he had filed with the putative father
registry. Id. at 254. While the Court of Appeals recognized that it might have been prudent to
give notice to Lehr, the court found it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to
grant the petition without notice. Id. 254-55.
144. Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 261.
146. Id. (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
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Additionally, the Court distinguished the equal protection claim from
that in Caban; whereas Caban had actively participated in parenting his
children, Lehr had not established any "custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with Jessica, thus equal protection did not require that both
parents be accorded the same rights.149
The "biology-plus" cases demonstrate the legal landscape for unwed
fathers in constitutional jurisprudence: biology, on its own, does not entitle
a man to the rights of parentage. In fact, as Lehr shows, not only is biology
alone insufficient to protect parental rights, the "plus" must be significant
enough for constitutional protection to attach. 150 In so doing, the Court has
defined paternity as something more than biology and appears to have
included a functional component in its analysis.15" ' The cases also
demonstrate the inherent paradox in predicating paternity determinations on
biology alone, without the father demonstrating any commitment to the
child or intent to parent. Justice Stevens noted this paradox in but three
sentences of his opinion in Lehr, where he wrote:
[The] Court has considered the extent to which the Constitution
affords protection to the relationship between natural parents and
children born out of wedlock. In some we have been concerned
with the rights of children. In this case, however, it is a parent who
claims that the State
has improperly deprived him of a protected
152
liberty.
in
interest
Perhaps Justice Stevens meant that in the paternity context, it is
important to identify a second legal parent for the child but that in the
adoption cases, the child's rights were adequately protected as another man
had already willingly assumed the role of father. Thus, there was no reason
to protect the rights of the unwed father. Neither approach makes much
sense: arguably, if the biological father's rights are not worthy of
149. Id. at 267-68. In discussing the equal protection claim, the Court wrote:
We have held that these statutes may not constitutionally be applied in
that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact similarly situated
with regard to their relationship with the child. In Caban v. Mohammed, [we]
held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to grant the mother a veto
over the adoption .

.

. but not .

.

. their father ....

[We] made it clear,

however, that if the father had not "come forward to participate in the rearing
of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause would preclude the State
from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that
child."
Id. at 267 (citations omitted). The State would not violate the Equal Protection Clause by
denying the father such veto. Id.
150. Id. at 261-62.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
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constitutional protection then he should not be declared a legal father
pursuant to biology alone under current Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Alternatively, if protecting the best interests of the child is paramount, it
would make more sense to permit the adoption and legalize the relationship
between the adoptive father and child while also maintaining a legal
relationship for the biological father so that the child has access to her
genetic history and, perhaps, another source of support. But both
approaches are inconsistent with the Court's adherence to the two-parent
family paradigm.
The "biology-plus" cases exemplify the Court's fondness for unitary,
"nuclear" families and the traditional parental paradigm.'53 For example, in
Quilloin and Lehr, by allowing the adoptions, the Court merely recognized
family units already in existence;"' whereas in Caban, to permit adoption
over the objection of the father was seen as violative of the family unit. 55
Interestingly, in Caban, however, the children had not been living with
their mother and stepfather, but rather, had been in the custody of their
maternal grandmother prior to the adoption proceedings.' 56 Perhaps the
Court would have considered the case differently if the facts had been
similar to Quilloin and Lehr. Professor David Meyer offers another possible
interpretation of the Court's opinions in these three cases, that the Court
was also concerned with the father's moral claim to a relationship with his
child.'57 Viewed this way, the Court was concerned not only with protecting
the child's relationship with the man s/he viewed as father, but also to
determine whether the biological father behaved in a way deserving of
58
constitutional protection. 1
The paternity cases further elucidate the difficulty of choosing one legal
father: because of the adherence to a two-parent paradigm, the Court must
craft its jurisprudence regarding the rights of unwed fathers to "fit" the
traditional model.1 59 So, in a case where the stepfather has actively parented
the children and the children are being raised by two loving parents, the
Court more easily discounts the rights of the unwed father who had no
interaction with the child."' But, in a case where the father actively

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. at 260 n.16.
See id. at 259, 261.
See id. at 259-60.
Caban, 441 U.S. at 382-83.
Meyer, supra note 60, at 764.
Id.
See id. at 759-60.
See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56.
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parented the children and sought to continue his relationship, the "plus" was
given credence. 161
Ultimately, in these cases the Court focused on an intact familial
relationship to determine paternal rights. While certain presumptions about
children are implicit in the opinions, namely that children will benefit from
a stable father figure in their lives, the Court relied heavily on the twoparent paradigm and chose the "better" father-a man who had
demonstrated greater commitment to the child. The Court
did not consider
62
men.1
two
for
rights
parental
preserving
the possibility of
The difficult permutations of legal reasoning between biological and
social fathers are highlighted in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 163 This case
demonstrates that the Court does not envision the possibility of multiple
fathers for a child, even if both men demonstrate emotional and financial
commitment to the child.' 64 In May 1976, Carole, an international model,
married Gerald, an executive in an oil company. 165 About two years into
their marriage, Carole began having an affair with a neighbor, Michael, and
she conceived a child; her daughter, Victoria, was born in May 1981.166
While Gerald was listed on Victoria's birth certificate as her father, blood
tests later revealed that Michael was Victoria's biological father. 167 When
Gerald moved to New York, Carole stayed in California. 68 Meanwhile,
Carole lived successively with two different men: Michael, "who held
Victoria out as his daughter," and a man named Scott. 169 In April 1984, after
Michael had spent the better part of eight months living intermittently with
Carole and Victoria in Los Angeles, "Carole and Michael signed a
stipulation that Michael was Victoria's natural father."' 170 One month later,
Carole left Michael; ultimately, she reconciled with Gerald in June of 1984

161. See, e.g., Caban,441 U.S. at 393-94.
162. Professor Meyer offers a new model of adoption law that would, indeed, recognize the
rights of more than two parents. See Meyer, supra note 60, at 822. Professor Meyer proposes
that "adoptive parents would gain custody, [and] full decision-making authority ... while the
biological parent would retain a right to visit and communicate with the child." Id.
163. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
164. See id. at 114-15, 118.
165. Id. at 113.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 113-14.
168. Id. at 114.
169. Id. Carole and Victoria resided with Scott for several months, but the facts do not
suggest that he held himself out as Victoria's father in any way and he was not a party to the
case. Id.
170. Id. at 114-15. Although the parties signed a stipulation of parentage, Carole instructed
her attorneys not to file the stipulation. Id. at 115.
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and moved with Victoria to New York, where the couple had two more
children. 171
Michael sought visitation rights and Gerald later intervened, arguing that
the marital presumption operated such that he was Victoria's legal father
and Michael had no standing to pursue a visitation order. 7 2 Upholding the
marital presumption, the trial court denied Michael continued visitation
' 17 3
with Victoria as it would "impugn[ ] the integrity of the family unit."
Michael alleged the decision violated his procedural and substantive due
process rights; and Victoria, who had also sought visitation rights for
Michael through a guardian ad litem, alleged a due process
violation,
4
7
1
Michael.
with
relationship
facto
de
her
seeking to maintain
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, began his discussion of Michael's
claims by noting that "California law, like nature itself, makes no provision
for dual fatherhood."1 7 1 In bringing his suit for visitation, Scalia noted
Michael was seeking to "be declared the father of Victoria." 116 By denying
Michael's status as father, all parental rights, including visitation, were
denied. 177 Michael claimed that his liberty interest in maintaining a
relationship with Victoria was violated by California's adherence to the
7
marital presumption; the Court did not agree. 1
Justice Scalia, firmly relying on history and tradition, upheld the validity
of the marital presumption as a way to preserve "family integrity and
privacy" by excluding inquiries into a child's paternity. 7 9 Moreover, he
noted that "persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria" have not been
treated as a protected family unit, but rather the marital family has been

171. Id.
172. Id. The applicable law provides that "the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." Id.
(quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)). Moreover, the presumption could be
"rebutted by blood tests, but only if a motion ...[was made] within two years ...of the child's
birth." Id.
173. Id. at 116 (quoting Supp. App. to Juris Statement A-91).
174. Id. at 115-16.
175. Id. at 118.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 118-19. Although he may have succeeded in securing visitation rights as a
nonparent, the Court held that the California Superior Court had correctly denied him visitation
rights against the wishes of the mother since he had been denied the right to establish paternity.
Id. at 119-21.
178. Id. at 126-27.
179. Id. at 120. Quoting Justice Powell's decision in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977), Scalia writes, "'[o]ur decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."' Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-24.
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protected.18 ° In rejecting Michael's claim to establish paternity and "thereby
obtain parental prerogatives,"'' Scalia wrote that someone in
Michael's position is not entitled to substantive parental rights:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within,
and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that has done
so. This is not the stuff of8 which
fundamental rights qualifying as
2
liberty interests are made. 1
Given Michael's biological connection, along with his significant
relationship with Victoria, it is seemingly inconsistent to reject his claim
under the reasoning of the "biology-plus" cases. In distinguishing Michael
from the unwed fathers in the biology-plus trio of cases, Scalia recognized
that in Lehr, the Court assumed that the Constitution might provide
protection for the unwed father, referring to the "significance of the
biological connection. ' But here, where "the child is born into an extant
marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the
similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage; and it is not
unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference for the latter."' 8 4
The Court similarly rejected Victoria's due process claim to maintain a
relationship with Michael, as "the claim that a State must recognize
multiple fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this
85
country."1
As Professor Nancy Polikoff has noted, the plurality in Michael H.
reinforces the State's interest "in assuring that every child has neither more
nor less than one mother and one father."' 8 6 Moreover, the opinion reifies a
narrow, traditional concept of family, whereby a wife and husband are the
"best" parents. 8 7 Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, observed that the
180. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
181. Id. at 126.
182. Id. at 127.
183. Id. at 128-29 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
184. Id. at 129.
185. Id. at 131. Victoria also claimed that her equal protection rights were violated because
she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of her legitimacy. Id. Because the Court had
determined her legitimacy under the presumption, it held she had not been discriminated against
and "allowing a claim of illegitimacy to be pressed by the child ...
may well disrupt an
otherwise peaceful union." Id.
186. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO. L.J.
459, 479 (1990).
187. Dolgin, supra note 6, at 670 ("The difference between Michael H. and the [three] other
cases . . . stems from the narrowness with which the concept 'family' was defined .... ").
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only difference between the two households was the fact of marriage and
that the plurality emphasized the importance of marriage in establishing a
unitary family, which directly contradicted the prior unwed father cases.188
Rejecting the plurality's view of a unitary family and its interpretation of
precedent, Justice Brennan wrote that "[t]he plurality's exclusive rather than
inclusive definition of the 'unitary family' is out of step" and the plurality's
"rhapsody on the 'unitary family' is out of tune."' 8 9 Finally, Justice Brennan
wrote of the plurality's "cramped vision of 'the family"' and concluded,
"[w]hen and if the Court awakes to reality, it will find a world very different
' 90
from the one it expects."'
Justice Brennan's reference to the "cramped vision of family" sums up,
in large part, the Court's jurisprudence regarding fatherhood. While Justice
Brennan was particularly alarmed by the narrow conception of family
employed by the plurality in Michael H., all of the biology-plus cases
represent the cramped two-parent paradigm, as well as the legal logistics of
choosing one father over another. The plurality's explicit rejection of
multiple parenthood continues to constrain courts and legislatures,
specifically in the context of "paternity fraud," as discussed in the next
section.
IV. BIOLOGICAL V. SOCIAL PATERNITY AND THE PATERNITY FRAUD
PHENOMENON

Stronger reliance on biological paternity is creating additional turmoil
within family law jurisprudence. One example is the paternity fraud
phenomenon: with the improvement of DNA testing, a growing number of
men who previously thought they had a biological connection to a child
they have helped to raise and/or for whom they were adjudicated father
have learned that they are not biologically related to their children.' 9' This
has lead to a flurry of legislation and court cases in which men are claiming
"paternity fraud" and seeking disestablishment of their paternity. 92 States
differ on the permissibility of nonpaternity claims, but biology plays a
leading role in the debate.' 93 I have previously argued that biology alone

Professor Dolgin further explains that by adhering to the traditional family, Michael could not
be considered part of the family and could not adequately demonstrate his social fatherhood. Id.
188. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 144.
189. Id. at 145.
190. Id. at 157.
191. Jacobs, PaternityFraud, supra note 22, at 193-95.
192. Id. at 193-94.
193. Id. at 194-95.
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should not disestablish parentage, but rather, functional parenthood should
suffice as the predicate for a legal parentage determination. 94 If biology
alone should not disestablish parentage, I contend that biology should not
serve as the sole basis for establishing the full range of rights and
responsibilities of parentage. 195

As with the cases discussed in the previous section, paternity fraud cases
force courts to choose either biological or social fathers. Courts and
legislatures have struggled in recent years to balance the interests of "duped
dads"' 9 6 and children in the context of paternity fraud. 197 On one side, courts
and legislatures have determined that maintaining a current parental
relationship with the nonbiological, social father promotes the best interests
of the child(ren) involved. 98 These courts are loathe to disestablish
paternity; yet, in maintaining the social father's paternity, these courts offer
no room for a biological father to establish a legal relationship with his
child. 9 9 On the other side, disestablishing paternity is seen as the best way
to promote the best interests of the nonbiological father who did not know
until after his paternity was established that he is unrelated to the child. 2°°
So, in some cases, courts will disestablish the paternity of a man who has
194. Id. at 239. I contend that a man who has established a relationship with a child,
functioned in all ways as a parent, should remain a legal parent and that a lack of biological
connection is not sufficient to disestablish the parent-child relationship. Id. at 239-40.
195. An additional point worth noting is that the decreased importance of biology to
paternity determinations will impact who is declared a legal parent and who is declared a
nonparent. Historically, if a person was not biologically related to the child or married to the
child's mother, that person was a nonparent and legal stranger to the child. See Jacobs,
Adjudicating Maternity, supra note 20, at 348-351 (discussing legal parents versus legal
strangers). Parentage should not be established by biology alone; other factors, such as intent
and function, should also play a role in establishing parentage. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris,
Reconsidering the Criteriafor Legal Fatherhood,1996 UTAH L. REV. 461, 480 (1996) (arguing
that functional parenthood is the best method for assigning the duties and granting the privileges
of parenthood); see also Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to

Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents,25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 448 (2005) (arguing that intentional and
functional parenthood should be used to legalize parentage for nonlegal lesbian coparents).
196. See Jacobs, PaternityFraud,supranote 22, at 196.

197. I use the term paternity fraud to discuss cases in which a nonbiological father seeks to
disestablish his legal paternity. Paternity fraud has gained significant public attention in recent
years. For a discussion of the paternity fraud phenomenon, see Jacobs, Paternity Fraud,supra
note 22, at 194-96 nn.8-17 and accompanying text.
198. See generally id. (discussing court decisions and legislative actions regarding
nonbiological fathers).
199. Id.
200. For more information on paternity fraud, see Jacobs, Paternity Fraud,supra note 22,
parts IV and V, which provide a thorough review of cases and statutes both enforcing the
current social paternity relationship as well as a review of the cases and statutes that permit
paternity disestablishment in the absence of a biological connection between the father and
child.
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parented a child for years because he learns he has no biological connection
to the child. Because our legal system does not permit recognition of two
fathers, the child is deprived of a relationship with one of her fathers in both
scenarios.
In Godin v. Godin,2 °' Mark lived with his daughter, Christina, until she
was eight years old, at which time he and Christina's mother divorced. °2
Mark did not challenge his paternity of Christina during the divorce, but six
years later, after hearing rumors that he might not be Christina's father, he
filed a motion for genetic testing. 2 3 The trial court denied the motion for
genetic testing, and the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the
State has a strong interest in the marital presumption and "in ensuring that
children born of a marriage do not suffer financially or psychologically
merely because of a parent's belated and self-serving concern over a child's
biological origins.,, 2°4 The Court held that ascertaining the genetic "truth" of
Christina's origins is subsidiary to her emotional and financial security and
to preserving her relationship with the only father she has ever known.2 5
Ultimately, the Vermont court placed the emphasis on Christina's best
interests, suggesting that the only "victim" in the case was Christina, not
Mark.20 6 If the genetic testing had been permitted and revealed nonpaternity,
Christina might have been left without any legal father, as the facts do not
indicate that her biological father was aware of her birth or in any way
involved in her life.
Other courts, though, have determined that it is the "duped dad" who is
the victim and his best interests should be protected, not the child's. In
Doran v. Doran, °7 the father, William, sought to disestablish his paternity
of Billy more than eleven years after Billy was born. 2 8 William lived with
Billy and Pamela, Billy's mother, for the first four years of Billy's life.
William and Pamela divorced when Billy was about five years old.20 9 At a
subsequent point, for reasons unexplained in the case, Billy's biological
father visited William's house, which lead William to ask Pamela if he was,
201. 725 A.2d 904 (Vt. 1998).
202. Id. at 906.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 910.
205. Id. The Court observed that Mark lived with Christina for the first eight years of her
life and continued to treat her as his daughter subsequent to the divorce. Id. Thus, "a parentchild relationship was formed, and it is that relationship, and not the results of a genetic test,
that must control." Id. at 910-11.
206. Id. at 912.
207. 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
208. Id. at 1281.
209. Id.
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in fact, Billy's father. 210 In response, Pamela affirmed William's paternity. 211
By 2001, however, William became convinced that he was not Billy's
father due to Billy's appearance and mannerisms; and he requested that
Pamela bring Billy for
DNA testing, which revealed a zero probability of
212
William's paternity.
Thereafter, Pamela told Billy that William was not his biological father,
and William "as gently as possible removed himself from the child's life in
a way which he felt would cause the child the least amount of anguish and
hurt., 213 William also sought an order to discontinue child support payments
and to disestablish his paternity.2 4 On appeal, the court held that the marital
presumption of paternity did not apply in this case, as the purpose of the
presumption is to preserve intact families and Pamela and William were
divorced.2 5 Moreover, the court held that William was not estopped from
denying his paternity, despite having held Billy out as his own son during
the marriage and afterwards and by exercising his visitation rights. 1 6 The
Court wrote that William only held Billy out as his own son because of
Pamela's "fraudulent conduct" and, thus, was not estopped from seeking to
disestablish his paternity. 27 The court's emphasis on Pamela's "fraudulent
conduct" and William's interests in being free of this burden ignored
altogether what served Billy's interests and took from Billy the only man he
had ever known as his father. 2 ' 8 By placing biological paternity over social
paternity, the court illegitimized Billy for the sake of biology and enforced a
notion of fatherhood that disregards nurturance and relies only on biological
connection.
A recent Michigan decision further illustrates the tension between
biological and social paternity and how the current two-parent paradigm
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1281-82. The trial court granted the order regarding future child support
payments but did not grant his motion to disestablish paternity; Pamela appealed. Id. at 1282.
215. Id. at 1283. "'The policy underlying the presumption of paternity is the preservation of
marriages.' . . . In this case, there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to preserve ....
Accordingly, the presumption of paternity is not applicable." Id. (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 1283-85.
217. Id.
218. Id. Quoting the trial court opinion, the court wrote of Pamela's subterfuge, intentional
misstatements, and deceptions, stating "[u]nfortunately, her deceit, falsehoods and
misrepresentations gave Mr. Doran no reason but to treat the child as his own-with love, care
and respect, as only a decent human being would do under the circumstances." Id. at 1284.
Interestingly, the court did not consider how this would affect Billy nor did the court address
that a "decent human being" might continue his parental relationship, as he had done for more
than eleven years.
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does not adequately meet the best interests of children, nor of two men
seeking to preserve a parent-child relationship. 2 '9 Rebeka Killingbeck had
sexual relationships with both Tony Rosebrugh and Dennis Killingbeck at
the time of conception of her son, Devon, born in July 1998.220 Before
Devon's birth, Rebeka moved in with Dennis and, four years later, they
married. 22' Dennis knew he might not be Devon's father, but prohibited
Rebeka from having any contact with Tony after Devon's birth, and
executed an acknowledgment of parentage even though he had no proof of
his biological paternity. 222 In September 2002, six months after their
marriage, Rebeka filed for divorce from Dennis and contacted Tony to
arrange genetic testing to determine Devon's parentage; the testing
confirmed Tony's paternity.223
Rebeka and Tony sought to revoke Dennis' acknowledgment of
paternity, although the divorce judgment listed Devon as a child of the
marriage.224 The trial court revoked the acknowledgment of parentage, but
granted Dennis the rights of a de facto father so long as his requests did not
diminish the rights of Tony. 5 The appeals court reversed.226 Narrowly
interpreting precedent regarding equitable or de facto parenthood, the
appeals court held that Dennis could not have any parental rights under
either doctrine since Tony was Devon's biological father. 227 Recognizing,
though, that the trial court had revoked the acknowledgment of parentage in
part because of its additional order regarding Dennis as a de facto parent,
228
the appeals court also reversed the revocation of the acknowledgment.
Thus, the appeals court continued to operate within a strict two-parent
paradigm: either Dennis would continue to be Devon's legal father pursuant
to the acknowledgment and, thus, be entitled to parental rights, or all of his
parental rights would be terminated in favor of Tony assuming the parental
role. As the dissent observed:

219. See Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 711 N.W.2d 759, 768-69 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
220. Id. at 761.
221. Id. at 761-62.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 762.
224. Id.
225. Id. The trial court noted that Dennis had rights to seek parenting time and would have
an obligation to pay support, thereby seemingly recognizing two fathers for Devon. Id. at 763.
226. Id. at 761.
227. Id. at 764-65. Prior Michigan cases recognized equitable parenthood only if the child
was born or conceived during marriage and as Rebeka and Dennis had married several years
after Devon's birth, the court said equitable parenthood did not apply. Id. at 764.
228. Id. at 766.
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On remand, if the trial court determines not to revoke Mr.
Killingbeck's acknowledgment of parentage, he will remain
Devon's legal father with full rights of visitation. However, Mr.
Rosebrugh . . . would have no grounds to seek visitation. If the
trial court again determines to revoke Mr. Killingbeck's
acknowledgment, he would be precluded from seeking visitation
with the child that he raised and supported from birth ....

Without

relying on equitable principles, Devon must be separated from one
of these men.229
Rather than disaggregating biological and social paternity to permit both
fathers to exercise rights and obligations for Devon, the court has given its
imprimatur to the trial court to continue rigidly adhering to the two-parent
paradigm, even though the two-parent paradigm does not adequately
represent Devon's best interests.
Some states have statutes under which men move to set aside paternity
judgments if genetic testing disproves their paternity, regardless of the
child's interests. For example, Ohio's paternity disestablishment statute,
enacted in 2000, provides that a man may seek relief from a child support
order if genetic testing proves that: 1) he is not the biological father of the
child; 2) he has not adopted the child; and 3) "the child was not conceived
as a result of artificial insemination., 230 An Ohio appeals court found the
statute unconstitutional in 2003:
Such a legislative mandate overlooks how complex the parentchild relationship is. A person who has served as a parent for
many years is still in many ways a parent to the child, no matter
whose genes and chromosomes are involved. If this were not so,
no adult could successfully adopt a child and raise the child to
adulthood.2 31

The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the validity of the statute,
observing that the legislature
"intended to create a substantive right to
23 2
address potential injustice.,
Statutes such as Ohio's do not adequately protect a child's best interests,
nor do the statutes embrace fatherhood as something more than biological
connection. By placing all of the emphasis on biological paternity, the
statutes disregard the importance of social paternity and the reality that
229. Id. at 769 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
230. State ex rel Loyd v. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (Ohio 2006) (citing OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (West 2002)).
231. Van Dusen v. Van Dusen, 784 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
232. Lovelady, 840 N.E.2d at 1065 (permitting a man to introduce genetic testing
disproving his paternity seven years after a default judgment of paternity was entered).
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many children have established relationships with their social fathers. Yet,
emphasizing only social paternity may similarly preclude a biological father
from establishing a relationship with his child, as Killingbeck demonstrates.
The paternity fraud phenomenon highlights the tension between biological
and social paternity and may, hopefully, serve as the impetus to recognize
more than one father.
V. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE CONCERNING BIOLOGICAL V. SOCIAL
PATERNITY

The disconnect between biological and social paternity has engendered
scholarly debate about the "correct" way to establish paternal rights. As
many scholars observe, social parenthood, predicated on function, intent,
and/or nurturance, is superior to establishing parental rights solely because
of a genetic connection in that social parenthood better reflects the panoply
of actions parentage entails.233 Yet other scholars have emphasized the
importance of preserving a child's genetic identity and ensuring appropriate
financial support for the child.234 A common theme which emerges from the
scholarship is the need to justify the "choice" between biological and social
paternity. In fact, even those scholars who advocate social paternity have
had difficulty addressing the financial and genetic concerns of biological
paternity advocates. By discussing some of the arguments in favor of both
biological and social paternity, I hope to highlight the difficulty of choosing
one methodology.
A. The Importance of PreservingBiologicalPaternity
Professor Katharine K. Baker has argued that biology should not suffice
to establish paternity but rather contract should provide the basis for
establishing parentage. 23" Baker, however, has identified three possible
rationales for our current paternity law, based solely on biology:
punishment of the father, assumption of the risk, and entitlement of the
child. 36 Punishment of the father is a way to thwart irresponsible sex and
encourage use of birth control; but, as Baker writes, birth control can fail
and, more significantly, we punish men who have done nothing wrong. In
fact, there are multiple cases in which a boy has been the victim of statutory
233.
234.
235.
236.

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.A.
See generally Baker, supra note 26.
Id. at 17-22.
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rape and is still adjudicated the father of the child and made to pay child
support. 37 Punishment does not seem to "fit" in many cases. Moreover, a
large portion of the paternity effort is focused on lower socio-economic
classes who, as noted below, may have no ability to support their children,
regardless of intent.
A second reason to use biology as the sole basis of paternity
establishment is closely linked with the first, assumption of the risk. If a
man engages in sexual intercourse, he assumes the risk that the woman will
become pregnant and must be prepared to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood. 238 To establish fatherhood using the assumption of the risk
methodology flies in the face of functional, nurturing parenthood. It also
sends a negative message about fathers generally; in an era in which men
are voicing their concerns for equal parenting time post divorce and
recognition of parental rights and complaining that they pay too much
support without concomitant visitation rights, it is seemingly incongruous
that society should place all of its emphasis in establishing parenthood on
financial responsibility.
The third reason for establishing paternity based on biology is the most
contentious: entitlement of the child. Entitlement of the child seemingly
incorporates two components, a financial component and a genetic identity
component. The difficulty of reconciling current paternity law with
constitutional jurisprudence is that legal parenthood embodies all of these
rights and responsibilities. Under current paternity law, if the biological
father is not adjudicated the child's legal father, he does not have a financial
responsibility to the child. But recognizing a biological father for support
237. See State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993). In that case,
a sixteen-year-old babysitter began sexual relationship with twelve-year-old boy, resulting in a
pregnancy when the babysitter was seventeen. Id. at 1274. The boy was adjudicated the baby's
father and required to pay child support. Id. at 1274-75. The court held that "[t]his State's
interest in requiring minor parents to support their children overrides the State's competing
interest in protecting juveniles from improvident acts, even when such acts may include
criminal activity on the part of the other parent." Id. at 1279; see also In re Parentage of J.S.,
550 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ill. App. 1990). In that case, the father did not contest paternity finding
but argued that he should not be responsible for minor child's support, as he was only fifteen
years old when the child was conceived. In re J.S., 550 N.E.2d at 258. The court disagreed and
determined that "the public policy mandating parental support of children overrides any policy
of protecting a minor from improvident acts." Id.
238. See Harris, supra note 195, at 473 ("In addition, the argument that the man who is
responsible for a child's conception should be responsible for the child's support because he has
voluntarily undertaken this obligation has a strong appeal, especially in a society such as ours
that regards voluntary assumption as an obvious justification for imposing legal duties."). But
see supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text (regarding a man who was adjudicated a father
and ordered to pay support although he and his girlfriend agreed that they did not intend to
parent and engaged in "safe sex").
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and genetic identity and history purposes may result in not recognizing a
different man who is functioning as the child's father. Until we disaggregate
parental rights and responsibilities, it is impossible to provide a child with a
father who is a partial source of financial support along with a second,
social father.
1. A Child's Entitlement to Child Support
Regarding the financial component, "but for" the father's actions, "the
child would not have been born" and thus is entitled to support.239 A child's
right to receive support and a host of benefits such as inheritance rights,
medical support, social security death benefits and more are predicated on
the establishment of a parent-child relationship.24 ° Using biology to
establish paternity is an easily applied, bright-line rule that is fairly simple
to administer. 24 ' Even proponents of social paternity agree that a biological
father should shoulder some financial responsibility for his biological child.
Professor Dowd argues that while a biological father, who has not
engaged in acts of nurturance, should be denied the full spectrum of rights
of parentage, the biological father should nonetheless pay child support,
embracing the entitlement of the child theory.242 Professor Baker argues that
the State should shoulder greater support for nonmarital children but,
perhaps, biological fathers can contribute some portion of child support,
even if not reflective of the child support guidelines. 243 Baker acknowledges
that if biology is no longer used to establish paternity and child support, the
current regime may require tremendous overhaul, as the government would
need to budget greater expenditures for children. 2 " Professor Oren argues
239. Baker, supra note 26, at 18.
240. Cynthia R. Mabry, Who Is the Baby's Daddy (and Why Is It Importantfor the Child to
Know)?, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 211, 233 (2004).
241. Harris, supra note 195, at 473.
242. Nancy E. Dowd, From Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining
Fatherhood,10 CARDOZO WOMEN's L.J. 132, 140 (2003). Professor Dowd agrees that economic
responsibility and rights to social fatherhood should not automatically be linked. Id. She writes,
"genetic fatherhood would generate economic responsibility but not relational rights; relational
rights would be dependent upon satisfying a definition of nurturing fatherhood." Id.
243. See Baker, supra note 26, at 66-68. Baker notes that other developed countries
provide greater support for children and do not place as much reliance on the support of two
parents acting alone. Id. at 66. She notes, however, that if society is concerned with the moral
obligation or deterrent functions of support, a biological father could pay a tax to provide
additional income for children. Id. at 67.
244. Id. at 66. Baker notes that even if the government did need to budget more for
children, it would merely "bring the United States up to par with the rest of the industrialized
world." Id.
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that biological fathers should pay support as a way to meet the "plus"
component of "biology plus" and thus not be thwarted in their attempts to
withhold their consent to adoption.245 Her argument makes sense in the
unwed father adoption context, but does not seem a strong enough rationale
to impose a child support obligation on the man who had his sperm stolen,
or who has engaged in one act of sexual intercourse with a woman and has
no intent to parent a child.
A critique of biological paternity as a way to ensure child support is the
evidence that child support enforcement may not actually be cost-effective.
The Department of Health and Human Services reported to Congress in
1993 that for every dollar spent on enforcement, four dollars of support
were collected.246 As Professor Leslie Harris points out, that claim does not

adequately consider what money would have been collected without the
support mechanisms, nor does it "analyze the relevant
statistic, which is the
247
cost of the marginal increases in support collected.,
Moreover, if the purpose of child support enforcement is to alleviate
poverty, the system is not working. Baker observes that the average unwed
father earns just over $16,000 a year, and that money spent on child support
enforcement might more appropriately be spent on a direct subsidy to
children.248 Additionally, Harris observes, "childhood poverty is often
attributed to single motherhood... [y]et many single parents do not receive
child support.

2 49

Murphy notes that the "child support regime has largely

failed to reduce child poverty.', 250 Furthermore, "aggressive child support
' The image of
enforcement has not reduced poverty for welfare families."251
245. Oren, supra note 13, at 129 ("How is a biological father to establish the 'plus' factor
when he has been thwarted of the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child? It seems
that the most obvious and 'fatherly' way to do that is to provide financial support, or at least try
to do so.").
246. Harris, supra note 195, at 476 (citing Office of Child Support Enforcement, U.S. Dep't
Health & Human Services, Eighteenth Annual Report to Congress 48 (1994)). On its website,
the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement reports that the "[tiotal distributed child
support collections were $21.9 billion for FY 2004. This was a 3.2 percent increase in
collections over the previous fiscal year . . . . More than half of all child support collections
come from never assistance cases." DIVISION OF PLANNING, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2004 PRELIMINARY
REPORT, http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2005/reports/preliminary-report/.
247. Harris, supra note 195, at 476.
248. Baker, supra note 26, at 66.
249. Harris, supra note 195, at 476.
250. Murphy, supra note 2, at 351.
251. Id. Murphy observes that "there has been limited success in obtaining child support
orders for never married mothers" who are most likely to be receiving public assistance. Id. at
351-52. Even if a child support order is obtained, it is not likely to exceed the welfare benefits
she receives and thus she has no direct benefit from the order. Id. at 352.
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the "deadbeat dad" who should pay support may also be misleading. More
than thirty-three percent of noncustodial fathers are "dead broke" and
themselves victims of poverty.252
Despite the critiques concerning a child's entitlement to financial
support, most scholars, courts, and legislatures agree that children are
entitled to a certain level of financial security and that biological fathers are
a good source for that support. But rather than use financial entitlement to
establish paternity based on biological connection and, therefore, open the
door to the full range of parental rights and responsibilities, courts should
consider a narrower legal recognition of biological paternity that creates
obligations where appropriate and even permits parental rights such as
visitation, while not creating an exclusive parent-child relationship.
2.

A Child's Entitlement to Her Genetic Identity and History

Another reason proffered to base paternity on biology is a child's
entitlement to her genetic identity. Genetic identity forms a part of a child's
history. It is important, too, that a child know her genetic identity for
medical history purposes. Professor Cynthia Mabry argues that while
financial support and medical history are reasons to be aware of genetic
identity, cultural identity is also important for children. 3 Mabry posits that
children have important emotional and psychological interests in knowing
their father's identity.254 In particular, she argues that children develop a
better sense of self when both parents are involved in their lives and that the
presence of a father in the life of an African American child is particularly
critical.255

Relying on the work of Dr. Alvin Poussaint, Mabry contends that for an
African American child, knowing her or his father is crucial to developing a
sense of cultural identity. 6 In addition, because African American men
experience racism differently than African American women, she suggests
252. Id. at 354. Murphy observes that many noncustodial fathers are minors, have
substandard education and job skills, may have substance abuse problems, criminal histories,
mental or physical health disabilities, and/or may be immigrants for whom English is a second
language. Id. at 354-55.
253. Mabry, supra note 240, at 232.
254. Id. at 228.
255. Id. Professor Mabry cites the testimony of Dr. Alvin Turner, who has testified that
"'[o]ne of the decisions that a child confronts as part of the developing identity is the degree to
which he or she will adopt characteristics of the parent."' Id. (citing testimony from Gary S.S. v.
Jacqueline D.S., No. CN93-07265, 98-18321, 1999 WL 692100, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 8,
1999)).
256. Id. at 232.
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that fathers will offer their children a different perspective on racism and
teach different types of coping skills. 257 Although her arguments about
cultural identity are largely directed at the African American community,
Mabry's concerns about genetic and cultural history transcend race and
ethnicity.258 Professor Dowd is similarly concerned with a child's right to
know her genetic identity, not only for medical and health reasons, but also
for cultural purposes.259

Professors Carbone and Cahn explore the importance of biology in
establishing commitment to a parent-child relationship; that is, does a
biological parent express greater commitment to his child than a nonbiological parent? 26° Based on their research of evolutionary psychology,
Carbone and Cahn conclude that men invest more money and time in the
" ' As a
children of their current mates, regardless of genetic connection.26
26
2
result, they propose a system of paternity testing at birth. By requiring
testing at birth, a married man who learns he is not the biological father will
either terminate the marriage and deny paternity at or close to birth, thereby
obviating paternity challenges later on, or will accept
paternity and similarly
263
future.
the
in
mind
his
be precluded from changing
Carbone and Cahn are most focused on stability for the child: not only
do they advocate paternity testing and determinations, they similarly
257. Id. at 231 ("African American boys need to learn how to cope in a society that fears
them from men who have had those experiences.").
258. The overriding issue is whether society should impose all of the rights and obligations
of parenthood on a biological father to assure a child access to his or her genetic and cultural
identity, or if there is a different method whereby the child still has that information and may
also have access to a second parent who provides support and nurturance.
259. Dowd, supra note 242, at 139 (arguing that genetic ties should create identity rights
and that a child's genetic ties would be part of her identity but that parents would be identified
by nurture, not their genetic ties to the child); see also Bartholet, supra note 58, at 323
(postulating that it might be wise to give a child access to her genetic heritage by requiring
DNA testing at birth, but that such testing does not mean that a biological father, without more,
should be entitled to visitation rights with the child).
260. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, II WM. & MARY BILLRTS. J. 1011, 1011 (2003).

261. Id. at 1035. Relying on studies of the effects of divorce on children, Carbone and Cahn
conclude, "[l]ove the one you're with" is a "better predictor of male contributions to children
than genetic ties." Id.
262. Id. at 1067-68. By making paternity testing routine, Carbone and Cahn hope to
eliminate some of the distinctions between the treatment of married men, who are presumed
fathers, and unmarried men, who must hold out a child as his own for the same presumption. Id.
at 1067. In addition, this testing will enable men to knowingly and willingly assume the
responsibilities of parenthood. For example, a married man who submits to testing, learns he is
not the genetic father, but assumes parental responsibility, will not later be able to challenge his
paternity. Id. at 1069.
263. Id.
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advocate a process for second-parent determinations." 6 That is, if a person
acknowledges and accepts parental responsibility for a child, neither parent
can later challenge the child's parentage.2 65 Thus, while Carbone and Cahn
recognize the importance of genetics to the formation of a parent-child
relationship, their proposal stops short of requiring a system whereby
women are required to identify the biological father and impose the
responsibilities of parenthood on a man who may have no interest in
parenting. 66 In a subsequent writing, Carbone emphasizes the importance of
biological connection in establishing parenthood. She concludes that
"parentage should be, first and foremost, about identity. Parenthood is, now
and historically, the legal category that answers the question: To which
family does this child belong?, 267 Carbone questions, however, whether
parental rights should be unbundled and comments favorably on the concept
of dual paternity, especially when only one father has the full panoply of
parental rights.268 Rather than automatically concluding that biological
parentage is best for children, Carbone concludes that irrevocable
establishment of parentage is best, so that a child knows where she
belongs. 69 Carbone does not embrace 7multiple
parents, each with various
°
rights and responsibilities of parentage.
B. The Importance of Preserving Social Paternity
Rather than basing paternity on biological connection, Professor Baker
proposes using contract theory to determine who should assume the rights
and obligations of parenthood. Recognizing that express contract has been
used in gestational surrogacy cases such as Johnson v. Calvert,2 7' Baker

writes that, in addition to biology, intent has been used to establish parental
rights. 72 Reliance and intent in contract law accords with the parties'
264. Id.
265. Id. ("The one irreducible element of the proposal is that, once two parents are
established on the basis of biology or acknowledgment at the child's birth, their parental status
cannot be challenged or changed without consideration of the child's interests ....
")
266. Id. ("This proposal does not necessarily require the identification of a father (or second
parent) for every child, but it does impose legal obligations on those who self-identify through
voluntary acknowledgments or paternity testing at the time of a child's birth."); see also id. at
n.235.
267. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertaintyat the Core of Family
Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2005).
268. Id. at 1341-42.
269. Id. at 1343-44.
270. Id. at 1343.
271. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
272. See Baker, supra note 26, at 26-27.
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expectations and is a much more useful determinate of parental rights than
genetic connection. She similarly argues that courts are embracing de facto
or equitable fathers whose rights are determined because of contract notions
of bargain and reliance. 273 By using the functional relationship, courts can
impose the obligations of parenthood because, arguably, the man expressed
elements of intent and reliance. Baker is reluctant, however, to deny
completely a biological father's obligation to contribute a minimal support
contribution, even if it is only in the form of a tax.274 While advocating

paternity based on contract, she is unable to remove the biological father
from the equation entirely, although she has not clarified what legal status
the biological father would have.
Professor Nancy Dowd has written extensively about the importance of
nurturing fathers and the need to recognize the rights of men who offer
emotional support and nurturance to children. She, too, believes paternity
based solely on biology is the wrong approach. Dowd writes, "[gienes
should not define fatherhood. This is wrong for men and wrong for
children. Genes define identity, but that link should be separated from the
obligations and rights of parenthood., 275 Instead, Dowd would define
fatherhood based on nurturance, function, and active parenting. 276 Dowd
advocates separating economic obligation from the benefits of social
relationships. 77 While her argument seemingly advocates paternity based
on nurturance, Dowd does not fully reject the genetic tie and does not
explicitly argue for a recognition of dual paternity.
Professor Harris notes several adverse consequences of basing legal
paternity on biology, including the fact that biological fatherhood as a basis
for child support duties defines fatherhood in financial terms only and
ignores the many other aspects of fatherhood.278 Moreover, she argues that
recognition of biological fatherhood may break up the relationship a child
already has with an existing social father and, further, may undermine
recognition of blended families. 9
273. Id. at 31-33.
274. Id. at 67. ("[I]f we are deeply concerned about the moral obligation or deterrent
functions that a biologically-based paternity system may serve, a tax on biological fathers could
serve those functions just as well while providing additional income for children.").
275. Dowd, supra note 242, at 134.
276. Id. at 135.
277. Id.at 141.
278. Harris, supra note 195, at 475.
279. Id. at 474. Professor Harris suggests that legal validation of biological paternity
undermines the many stepfathers and other social fathers who may support the children with
whom they are living, rather than their biological children with whom they have no emotional
attachment. Id. at 474-85. These stepfathers are characterized as deadbeat dads to their
biological children, and their contributions to the children with whom they live may be legally
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The arguments for social paternity are consistent with the direction of
current family law. As previously discussed, courts are placing greater
emphasis on functional parenthood. s° In fact, the American Law Institute
promulgated Principles of Dissolution in which the members advocate the
recognition of parents by estoppel and de facto parents. These equitable
doctrines are based on a combination of nurturance, functional parenthood,
and intent. By recognizing these elements of parenthood, more than mere
financial paternity, courts embrace newer ideas of fatherhood and recognize
that more than ever before, fathers seek involvement in their children's lives
and wish to be more than a financial resource.
Scholars advocating social paternity, however, have not fully addressed
the legal status of the biological father. If he is required to contribute some
financial support, on what legal basis should courts impose that obligation?
Below, I hope to address the gap that exists in the current scholarly debate.

VI. DISAGGREGATING BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL PATERNITY TO RECOGNIZE
Two LEGAL FATHERS

Many fathers are both biological and social fathers. There are instances,
however, in which biological and social paternity do not coincide, and the
legal maneuvering to justify one father over the other has created a system
whereby the best interests of the child may not be realized nor protected.
Rather than impose all of the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood on
one man, the law should disaggregate biological and social paternity, where
appropriate, and recognize two fathers for each child. Not only will this
proposal permit better protection and preservation of a child's best interests,
it will also ensure greater fairness for biological and social fathers, as
detailed below.
In discussing the benefits and rationales for both biological and social
paternity, the difficulty of choosing one type of father over the other
emerges. There are many reasons to recognize social fathers and protect
their interests and the interests of childreii to maintain relationships with the
men who have cared for them. But children also have an interest in their
genetic history and in financial support. By choosing one father over the
other, children's best interests may be ignored in favor of maintaining a
ignored. Id. Thus, Professor Harris argues that functional paternity should serve as the basis for
legal rights and duties of parenthood. Id.
280. Bartholet, supra note 59, at 326-27 ("The dominant trend in law today is in the
direction of reducing the importance of biology as a factor in defining parentage. Increasing
emphasis is being placed on established and intended parenting relationships, with these factors
sometimes weighing equally with or even outweighing biology." (footnotes omitted)).
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two-parent paradigm. Recognition of the rights of both biological and social
fathers best preserves a child's best interests.
Essentially, I contend that courts adopt a scheme of "relative rights." A
biological father with no parental intent might have his paternity recognized
for genetic history purposes, but would have no further legal obligations nor
legal rights to maintain a relationship with the child. Removing the heavy
financial burden from a biological father with no parental intent is
consistent with biology-plus jurisprudence and lends greater consistency to
family law jurisprudence. A man engaging in significant social parenting
without a biological connection to the child would support the child and
would reap the benefits of custody and/or visitation. In the paternity fraud
context, courts would no longer disestablish paternity because of a lack of
biological connection; the social relationship and obligations which flow
there from would be maintained. If, however, a biological father sought
access to his child, he could also have legal recognition as the biological
father, defray some of the support costs, and seek visitation with the child.
Neither biological nor social paternity would be preferred as a norm, but
rather courts would preserve existing relationships and permit additional
relationships that serve the child's best interests.28'
Critical to the recognition of multiple parents is the disaggregation of
parental rights and responsibilities. At present, the establishment of legal
parentage entails all of the responsibilities of parentage, such as financial
and medical support, and all of the benefits, such as the right to custody and
visitation. By separating and disaggregating all of these rights and
responsibilities, more than one father may hold the designation of "legal
father," yet each will make different contributions. For example, one father
may primarily be responsible for support and also have full physical
custody while the other father may have limited visitation and pay a modest
support stipend.
The difficulty of this proposal is that it eschews current bright-line rules
in favor of a case-by-case determination of what best serves the child's
interests. If limiting the role of a biological father to genetic history
purposes alone is best, the court can do so at the initial paternity hearing and
make clear to the biological father that he will not have any visitation or
custodial rights. If the biological father wants to preserve some visitation
rights, even for the future, then he will likely need to agree to contribute
some child support. The support obligation, however, should not be
281. Recognition of multiple fathers is not entirely new. Professor David Meyer has
previously advocated for recognizing more than one father in cases in which a biological father
may have been thwarted in his attempt to prevent an adoption of his child by a stepfather. See
supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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consistent with current child support guidelines if the father has no parental
intent or interest.
The flexibility of a case-by-case determination is that courts would be
able to recognize the legal status of both the biological and social father in
other contexts. In many cases, a child would benefit from the financial and
emotional support of two fathers, rather than one. In the paternity fraud
context, the social father would continue to support the child, financially
and emotionally, but the biological father (if identified) could share the
support obligation and develop a relationship with the child, too.
The concept of dual paternity has been adopted by at least one
jurisdiction, Louisiana. In Geen v. Geen,282 a Louisiana appellate court
applied statutes permitting dual paternity to recognize custodial rights of
two fathers. Prior to her marriage to Kevin Geen (Geen), Donna Geen
Robertson had a sexual relationship with Kevin Robertson (Robertson), and
Donna was pregnant when she married Geen in 1990.283 Donna informed
Robertson of the pregnancy, but elided his queries concerning whether he
was the baby's father.2 84 Ryan was born in July, 1991, nine months after
Donna and Robertson last had sex. 285 Donna and Geen separated more than
a year after Ryan's birth; pursuant to their divorce decree, Donna and Geen
were awarded joint legal custody of Ryan and Geen was designated the
primary custodial parent with liberal visitation to Donna.2 86
Shortly thereafter, Donna resumed her relationship with Robertson and
they subsequently married.28 7 Although Geen has been the primary custodial
parent, he has encouraged Ryan to spend considerable time with Donna and
Robertson. 8 8 DNA testing revealed that Robertson is Ryan's biological
father and Robertson sought to establish his paternity and he and Donna
sought primary physical custody of Ryan.289
The court had to consider several questions, including whether
Robertson had waited too long to file an action of avowal2 90 and which
282. 95-984 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/27/95); 666 So.2d 1192.
283. Id. at 1193.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1193-94.
287. Id. at 1194.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. The court noted that article 184 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides that
the husband of a child's mother is presumed to be the child's father, does not prohibit a
biological father from also establishing his paternity. Id. "Moreover, the presumed father's
failure to disavow paternity does not preclude the biological father from bringing an avowal
action." ld. (citing Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989)). Louisiana has since amended its
paternity laws and now specifically permits a biological father to establish his paternity within
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parent(s) should have primary custody of Ryan. Because Donna did not tell
Robertson that she believed he was Ryan's father until after she separated
from Geen, the court determined that he had not waited too long to establish
paternity. 29' A thornier question, perhaps, was deciding who should have
primary physical custody of Ryan; the trial court awarded physical custody
to Donna and Robertson but the appellate court reversed.29 2
The court emphasized that Geen had been "faithfully fulfilling the role of
father" for a significant period of time and had been the primary caretaker
and a constant in Ryan's life. 293 Regardless of the marriage of the biological
parents, the court found that Geen, a "model legal parent," should not have
294
his parental rights trumped when he has been an exemplary parent.
Ultimately, the court awarded joint legal custody to all three parents with
primary physical custody to Geen and liberal visitation to Donna and
Robertson.: 95 While Geen is not the only Louisiana case to apply dual
paternity, it provides a wonderful illustration of the possibility of
recognizing multiple fathers: both the biological and social fathers are now
legal parents and the father who has exercised greater responsibility for the
child has the primary role in the child's life.
I suggest that other jurisdictions similarly employ dual paternity or other
methodologies for recognizing the rights of biological and social fathers. If
a biological father is identified at birth or, as in the paternity
disestablishment context, if a biological father is identified later in the
child's life, that biological father should be given legal recognition. Legal
recognition of the biological father gives the child a sense of her genetic
identity and history and permits her to develop a relationship with her
biological father, if both persons so desire. Identification of a biological
father also may provide some financial stability and security for the child.
If the biological father has had no contact with the mother, other than the
act of intercourse which resulted in pregnancy, it seems inappropriate to
place a full child support obligation on him, especially given that statistics
reveal that poverty is largely not alleviated by child support orders. A small
contribution both protects and preserves the biological father's right to
one year of the child's birth, even if the child is presumed to be the child of another man. The
statute contains a tolling provision "if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child
regarding his paternity" and provides that the biological father should institute the action within
a year of the day the biological father learns of his paternity or the child's tenth birthday,
whichever first occurs. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2005).
291. Geen, 666 So. 2d at 1195.
292. Id. at 1194.
293. Id. at 1196.
294. Id.
295. ld. at 1197.
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maintain a relationship with his child, provides some financial benefit to the
child, and may provide access to additional benefits, such as survivor
benefits or health benefits. Biological fathers with no parental intent nor
parenting role would no longer have child support orders predicated on
mandatory child support guidelines. Instead, a judge would exercise
discretion and review the totality of the circumstances to determine if a
child support order was warranted and, if so, the appropriate amount of the
order.296
Restricting the role of the biological father would not be required; if the
biological father has demonstrated intent and a commitment to the child, he
would be given greater rights, such as enhanced visitation rights, and also a
greater responsibility to pay support for the child. If no other man has
assumed a social parenting role, the biological father could establish himself
as the "primary" father of the child. If, however, a social father was actively
parenting, nurturing, and supporting the child, the biological father could
establish and preserve a visitation relationship with the child and also pay
support for the child's well-being. The social father would be the primary
father, with greater custodial rights, but the biological father's parental
rights would still be recognized. As noted above, this would establish a
scheme of "relative rights" based on the amount of parental interaction each
man demonstrates.
Thus, in those instances where a biological father is identified for genetic
history and minor support only, the child would also have the ability to have
another legal father recognized, her social father. If the mother began a
long-term relationship with a man other than the biological father who
nurtured and supported the child, that man could also be legally recognized
as a father and his rights and the child's rights to maintain the relationship
would be preserved.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,297 for example, both men would have had
their legal paternity recognized, Michael as the biological father and Gerald
as the social father. They could have shared the financial responsibility for
Victoria and, as Victoria would have lived in Gerald's home, Michael could
have had reasonable visitation. There would have been no imposition on
Gerald's parental autonomy, as Michael would also be a parent. The
situation would not be significantly different from a couple that divorces, a
296. Baker proposes using contract theory to determine damages that would serve as
support. See Baker, supra note 26, at 55. She recognizes the unfairness and inconsistency within
the law of requiring a man who had no intent to parent nor acted as a father to pay twenty or
twenty-five of his income, regardless of reviewing the case circumstances and the child's actual
need. Id. at 56.
297. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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parent remarries, and two people perform the day to day caretaking while
the noncustodial parent has visitation rights. Victoria would benefit by
maintaining active, loving, relationships with both fathers and would further
benefit from their combined financial support.
Establishing paternity for two men permits courts to appropriately
allocate the obligations and benefits of parenthood among the biological
and social fathers. It would give courts discretion to limit the rights of
biological fathers while preserving the best interests of the child. Moreover,
multiple parenthood is a daily reality for many American families, where
step-parents and extended family members assume parental functions, but
do not receive legal recognition of their role. My proposal merely asks
courts to recognize de jure what is a de facto reality: multiple fatherhood.
While my proposal has been presented in the specific context of paternity, I
expect that ultimately, courts will recognize multiple parenthood in other
contexts as well.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Current paternity laws do not recognize a child's right to have a
relationship with both her biological and social father. By adhering to a
strict two-parent paradigm, paternity jurisprudence is a patchwork of
doctrines, some of which rely on social paternity and others which rely
solely on a biological connection to establish all of the rights and
obligations of fatherhood. Rather than continue a regime which requires
choosing biological or social fathers and, perhaps, disrupting existing
parental relationships or precluding additional parental relationships, courts
should instead disaggregate the rights of fatherhood and recognize both
biological and social fathers. By so doing, courts will preserve the best
interests of the child, demonstrate greater fairness to men who have no
intent to parent, and will promote the integrity of parentage by function and
intent, rather than DNA alone.

